David Lanius

Research

My area of specialisation is applied philosophy, philosophy of education, the didactics of philosophy, philosophy of language, epistemology, logic, and argumentation theory. I am particularly interested in how to make philosophy fruitful to societal issues and in how to teach philosophy to students in universities and schools.

My current research focus

I am interested in how (and whether) people change their convictions based on rational argumentation. Are good arguments ultimately convincing also to someone who does not share one’s beliefs already? How are we to deal with people who believe in “alternative facts?” Are there specific argumentative practices tied to modern populism, or is it all rhetoric?

At the moment, I am examining how argumentative abilities can be effectively acquired and taught in schools and universities and how the teaching of the epistemic and reflective competencies of philosophy can help to counter fake news and populism.

These questions are part of a larger project to develop an interdisciplinary model of general judgment formation for schools and universities, in which I bring together current research on the promotion of analytical-hermeneutic, argumentative, epistemic and metacognitive competence and ground the concept of judgment competence philosophically and didactically as well as operationalize it for teaching practice.

Selected Publications

Books

Articles

Edited works

Not yet published

  • Jaster, Romy & David Lanius (forthcoming): “Deeper into Populist and Authoritarian Bald-Faced Bullshit”, Topoi
  • Breitwieser, Anna & David Lanius (under review): “Epistemische Kompetenz im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht”
  • Schefczyk, Michael & David Lanius (under review): “Weighing the Reasons: Epistemic Costs and Benefits of No-Platforming”
  • Schönbrodt, Sarah, Unfried Sarah & David Lanius (in preparation): “Fairness in der datengetriebenen algorithmischen Kreditvergabe: Mathematik- und philosophiedidaktische Modelle in der Schulpraxis”
  • Breitwieser, Anna & David Lanius (in preparation): “The Dimensions of Epistemic Competence: A General Conceptualization for Cross-Sectional Teaching”
  • Kucharzyk, Karoline & David Lanius (in preparation): “Argumentationskompetenz in der Geographiedidaktik”
  • Gessner Susann, Gaus, Eva-Maria & David Lanius (in preparation): “On the Didactics of Democratic Discourse Ability”
  • Lanius, David (in preparation): “Indeterminacy in Political Discourse”

My current book project

Teaching judgment competence: An interdisciplinary model of general judgment formation for schools and universities

Judgment competence is listed as an educational goal in almost every curriculum, in school and university syllabi, in most textbooks, introductory works, and research papers in the fields of political science, literature and social studies, philosophy, and ethics education. At its core, it refers to the ability to make well-founded and reflective judgments. It is considered a key competence for turning students into responsible members of society, in line with the principle of non-indoctrination (Schiele et al., 1977).

At the same time, the term “judgment competence” is often used as a placeholder and rarely linked to specific learning objectives. There seems to be a lack of clarity about what it means to be able to make well-founded and reflective judgments. What standards does judgment competence encompass? What distinguishes it from reflection, orientation, argumentation, or decision-making competence? Does “judgment competence” mean the same thing in different subject-specific didactics, or does its understanding vary across disciplines?

Often, specific terms like political, historical, economic, psychological, ethical, social scientific, or philosophical judgment competence are used. Against this backdrop, the further question arises: Is there even such a thing as a general judgment competence that could be described independently of content? Of course, judgment competence cannot be acquired or exercised without content. Competencies always require an object in order to be exercised and acquired. One can only learn to read by learning to read specific texts. And yet, it seems that if one can read, one possesses a skill that is independent of the specific texts with which one learned to read. Is this analogous to well-founded and reflective judgment? Does judgment competence consist of abilities that can be abstracted from their object, or are they necessarily subject-specific? Many intellectual skills, such as playing chess or Sudoku, are not transferable, or only to a very limited extent, to excel in other intellectual activities (Sala & Gobet, 2017; Simons et al., 2016). Is well-founded and reflective judgment more comparable to specific activities like playing chess or generalizable activities like reading?

In the book, I argue for the following seven theses and show how one should understand judgment competence in order to concretely fulfill the generally recognized and usually only very vaguely invoked educational goals:

  1. Thesis: Judgment competence is rightly a central educational goal and should be systematically taught as such.
  2. Thesis: Judgment competence can be described independently of specific subjects.
  3. Thesis: At its core, judgment competence consists of hermeneutic-analytical, argumentative, epistemic, and metacognitive competencies.
  4. Thesis: Judgment competence can and should be taught in traditional educational institutions.
  5. Thesis: Judgment competence should be taught across subjects.
  6. Thesis: The development of judgment competence should not be equated with judgment formation in the classroom.
  7. Thesis: The systematic development of judgment competence within traditional educational institutions is more important than ever due to the digital transformation of society.
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